Amazon Kiro AI IDE Vulnerability Exposes Sensitive Data to Exfiltration
Cybersecurity researchers have uncovered a critical vulnerability in **Amazon Kiro**, an AI-powered integrated development environment (IDE), that could lead to sensitive data exfiltration. The flaw, which doesn't have a CVE identifier, leverages prompt injection and Kiro Powers to allow attacker-controlled content to influence the AI agent and transmit local information to external endpoints.
A new report from **Mindgard** details a significant security flaw within **Amazon Kiro** IDE version 0.7.45 for Windows. This vulnerability, which is not yet assigned a CVE, enables attackers to exfiltrate sensitive data from a user's local machine without explicit consent.

### How the Attack Works
According to **Mindgard** CMO **Fergal Glynn**, the vulnerability allows malicious repository content to influence the **Kiro** agent, ultimately causing sensitive local data to be transmitted to an external endpoint. The attack exploits **Kiro Powers**, which bundle Model Context Protocol (MCP) server configurations, steering files (**POWER.md**), hooks, and contextual knowledge. The steering file acts as an "onboarding manual," providing persistent context to the AI agent.
Successful exploitation requires two specific user actions: the user must open a malicious project via a workspace file using "File β Open Workspace From File" (rather than opening the folder directly), and then send any message to the agent. Crucially, the user does not need to submit a malicious prompt or reference the attacker-controlled content. Merely sending any message after opening the crafted workspace file is sufficient to trigger the data exfiltration.
### Trust Boundary Failures in AI IDEs
**Mindgard** highlights that the core of the issue lies in the interpretation of attacker-controlled project content as instructions, which then influence security-sensitive operations within the IDE. This represents a trust boundary failure across the entire sequence:
1. Repository-controlled content influences the agent.
2. The agent reads sensitive local information.
3. The agent writes that information into security-relevant IDE configuration.
4. A subsequent IDE capability converts the modified configuration into network activity.
This flaw underscores the growing security challenges in AI development environments, where the integration of interpretation and execution within the same workflow can create new attack vectors.
### Previous Kiro Vulnerabilities and Broader AI Tool Risks
**Amazon** has since addressed this specific vulnerability in **Kiro IDE** version 0.8.140, following responsible disclosure. "We addressed this finding, in the January 15 Kiro IDE update, shortly after it was reported to us," an **Amazon** spokesperson confirmed.
This isn't the first time **Kiro** has faced security scrutiny. In June 2026, **Amazon** patched an insufficient access control flaw (**CVE-2026-10591**, CVSS score: 8.8) that could allow remote unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary commands via crafted instructions. This previous vulnerability could enable auto-execution on folder open by writing to execution-sensitive paths like `.vscode/tasks.json` or `~/.kiro/settings/mcp.json`.
The findings also resonate with a broader trend of vulnerabilities discovered across various AI tools, including:
* A vulnerability chain in **OpenAI Codex CLI** for Windows, abusing prompt injection for covert host-level command execution.
* Zero-click remote code execution vulnerabilities in **Cursor CLI** and **Cursor** itself, exploiting indirect prompt injection and search order hijacking.
* Privilege escalation flaws (**CVE-2026-35603**) impacting **Anthropic Claude Code**, **Cursor**, **Codex CLI**, and **Google Gemini CLI**, allowing low-privileged attackers to execute commands.
* Sandbox escape vulnerabilities in **Claude Code** (**CVE-2026-25725**) and **Gemini CLI**, enabling attackers to run arbitrary code on the host system or steal OAuth tokens.
* Vulnerabilities in **NVIDIA NemoClaw** (**CVE-2026-65105**) and **OpenClaw**, allowing website-initiated control of local AI agents.
* A critical vulnerability (**CVE-2026-41613**, aka **Envade**) in **Microsoft Visual Studio Code's MCP install dialog**, enabling full code execution via crafted deep links.
* **PromptFiction** in **Claude Desktop**, allowing AI agents to be tricked into unintended actions like data harvesting or running arbitrary code.
These incidents highlight the critical need for robust security practices and continuous vigilance in the rapidly evolving landscape of AI development tools.