A recent investigation by **WIRED**, based on internal records acquired through Freedom of Information Act requests, has unveiled hundreds of allegations detailing the misuse of sensitive law enforcement databases by **CBP** personnel. These records, spanning from 2009 to 2022, paint a troubling picture of federal agents exploiting their access for personal gain and, in some cases, for illicit purposes. ### A Pattern of Personal and Criminal Misconduct The allegations reveal a broad spectrum of abuse. **CBP** officers were accused of querying data to look up romantic interests, monitor family members, and expose personal information. More alarmingly, some employees allegedly provided intelligence to suspected smugglers or drug-trafficking organizations. One case described a **CBP** officer using government databases to contact a flight attendant, while another involved an officer reportedly pulling information from trusted-traveler applications to ask individuals out. Other incidents included providing border-crossing data to someone involved in a "heated divorce." In a significant first, a **Department of Homeland Security (DHS)** employee allegedly used controversial ad-tech-derived location data to track several coworkers' cell phones. ### Expanding Surveillance, Expanding Vulnerability These revelations come as immigration and border authorities continue to expand their surveillance capabilities through technologies like facial recognition, license plate readers, mobile-device searches, and commercially purchased location information. "**Customs and Border Protection** has a long history of impunity and abuse of people's civil and human rights," stated Laura Rivera, an attorney with **Just Futures Law**. "As our society adopts more AI, data collection, and surveillance tools, each of us becomes increasingly vulnerable." The dataset underscores how the very tools designed for law enforcement purposes can be weaponized against private individuals when oversight is insufficient. ### Internal Accountability Challenges Complaints involving **CBP** personnel were initially routed through the Joint Intake Center, now the **CBP Intake Center**, which uses the Joint Intake Case Management System. Analysts would determine whether allegations warranted retention, referral to a manager, or assignment to **CBP**'s **Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR)** for serious misconduct. Of nearly 300 data-related entries identified by **WIRED**, 138 were referred to **CBP** management, 78 were deemed serious enough for **OPR** criminal investigators, and 43 were classified as "Information Only," meaning **OPR** did not open an investigation. A smaller number fell into other categories, including administrative inquiries and cases of "Immediate Management Actions." ### Breaches, Unauthorized Disclosures, and Self-Queries **WIRED** identified 99 entries involving alleged breaches or unauthorized disclosures of data and 48 explicitly involving improper database queries. Many of these incidents occurred around 2020, coinciding with the pandemic-driven shift to remote work, which saw **CBP** employees emailing work files to personal accounts. Notably, at least six entries explicitly describe employees querying themselves. Daniel Altman, former head of the **Office of Professional Responsibility**, indicated that the agency views self-queries as a red flag, often surfacing early in corruption cases as a means for employees to test monitoring systems or check for ongoing investigations against themselves. This suggests that such actions are often precursors to more significant misconduct.