# Covert Influence: BlackCore's Alleged Training of Angolan Officials An Israeli influence-for-hire firm, **BlackCore**, has reportedly trained Angolan government officials in the art of online influence operations. Research by the **University of Toronto's Citizen Lab** reveals that this training encompassed the creation of fictitious social media personas and the production of content aimed at promoting the Angolan government's agenda. **BlackCore** previously marketed itself as an "elite influence, cyber, and technology firm built for the modern era of information warfare." Documents obtained by **Citizen Lab** show an initial four-week course that expanded into a 14-week program, combining theoretical training with practical operational execution. ## The Angola Project: Promoting 'Positive Government Campaigns' Participants in the program generated over 40 pieces of content, with trainers evaluating at least 24 publications. The initiative also leveraged **Facebook** and **Instagram** advertising, alongside a **TikTok** campaign. The stated goal, according to **BlackCore**, was to foster "positive government campaigns" and portray the Angolan government "in a positive light," rather than directly attacking opponents, as noted by **Citizen Lab** senior researcher **Alberto Fittarelli**. Central to the operation was a **Facebook** page for a fabricated media outlet named "Agita News." This page published original material and linked to articles on an external website, both of which are now offline. **BlackCore**'s broader marketing materials boasted more aggressive capabilities, including the provision of hundreds of fake personas, or "avatars," across **Facebook**, **Instagram**, and **TikTok**. Services included flooding online platforms with coordinated messages, generating engagement from genuine users, and countering undesirable narratives with bespoke content. ## Measuring Impact and Evading Detection While assessing the true impact of an influence operation on public opinion is challenging, **BlackCore** seemingly aimed to demonstrate the effectiveness of its Angola operation. Screenshots from the company’s final report, cited by **Citizen Lab**, showed some deceptive **Facebook** posts garnering approximately 20,000 likes. Some accessible posts later approached 50,000 likes – a substantial figure in a nation with an estimated six million active **Facebook** users. **Citizen Lab** could not independently verify the training's occurrence or the identities of participating Angolan government employees. However, the combination of internal documents and online infrastructure uncovered by researchers strongly suggests the program unfolded as described by **BlackCore**. Researchers informed **Recorded Future News** that they found no evidence detailing the hiring process, direct payment by the Angolan government, or the cost of the operation. Since the training, which likely commenced in February, **BlackCore**'s websites and social media accounts have been taken offline. **Citizen Lab** was unable to locate a current contact for the company, and the Angolan government did not respond to requests for comment. ## Broader Operations and European Scrutiny **BlackCore**'s activities have previously attracted attention from European authorities. France's foreign-interference watchdog, **Viginum**, stated in June that an information operation targeting the left-wing **France Unbowed** party and its candidates during municipal elections exhibited technical links to Israeli actors, including **BlackCore**. This campaign involved websites and coordinated social media accounts to disparage candidates and polarize political discourse. French authorities could not identify the commissioner of this operation. **Viginum** later indicated that **BlackCore** was also suspected of interference activities targeting elections or political audiences in New York, Scotland, Angola, and Togo. In an August threat report, **Meta** announced it had disrupted a coordinated network originating in Israel that targeted audiences in Angola and other countries. According to **Citizen Lab**, this network was highly likely operated by **BlackCore**. **Citizen Lab** emphasizes that the Angola case highlights how governments can increasingly acquire ready-made infrastructure and expertise for covert online influence campaigns from private contractors. **BlackCore**'s proposal for Angola promised a "professional, robust, and scalable" system for government communications. **Fittarelli** noted to **Recorded Future News** that it is "not highly common" for contractors to train clients to conduct influence operations themselves, rather than running campaigns on their behalf. He added, "Training clients to run their operations independently has been historically observed as a likely way to evade detection."