<i>This is the fourth installment of a blog series reflecting on the global digital legacy of the 2011 Arab uprisings. You can <em>read the rest of the series <a href="https://eff.org/tags/digitalhopesrealpower">here</a>.</em></i> **Internet Shutdowns: A Growing Trend** Iran’s internet has been <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/03/06/iran-internet-shutdown-violates-rights-escalates-risks-to-civilians">intermittently disrupted</a> for months. After years of bombardment, Gaza’s telecommunications infrastructure <a href="https://7amleh.org/storage/Advocacy%20Reports/Telecommunications%20Report.pdf">remains fragile</a>. In India, <a href="https://restofworld.org/2024/india-internet-shutdown-record/">recurring shutdowns</a> and throttling have become a routine response to protests and unrest, cutting millions off from news, work, and basic services. Across <a href="https://www.accessnow.org/campaign/keepiton/#global-tracker">dozens of other countries</a>, governments increasingly treat connectivity itself as something that can be weaponized—cut, slowed, or selectively restored to shape what people can see, say, and share. In 2024 alone, authorities imposed <a href="https://www.accessnow.org/keepiton-data-dashboard/">304 internet shutdowns across 54 countries</a>—the highest number ever recorded. In 2011, when protesters in Tunisia, Egypt, and beyond used social media to broadcast their uprisings to the world, many observers heralded a new era of networked freedom. Governments, however, responded quickly by developing and refining systems of control that have only grown more sophisticated over time. Today’s landscape of regulation, blackouts, and degraded networks reflects that trajectory, as early experiments in censorship and disruption have hardened into a durable system of control—what began as an emergency measure has become a normalized infrastructure of control. ### A Brief History of Internet Shutdowns Egypt’s <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-12306041">2011 internet shutdown</a> wasn’t the first. Although the government’s heavy-handed response after just two days of protests caught the world’s attention, Guinea, Nepal, Myanmar, and a handful of other countries had previously enacted shutdowns. But Egypt marked a turning point. In the years that followed, <a href="https://www.accessnow.org/campaign/keepiton/#global-tracker">shutdowns increased sharply worldwide</a>, suggesting that governments had taken note—adopting network disruptions as a tactic for suppressing dissent and limiting the flow of information within and beyond their borders. On January 28, 2011, at 12:34 a.m. local time, five of Egypt’s internet service providers (ISPs) <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2011/jan/28/egypt-cuts-off-internet-access">shut down their networks</a>. At least one provider—Noor, which also hosted the Egyptian stock exchange—remained online, leaving only about 7% of the country connected. In the aftermath of President Hosni Mubarak’s resignation, rights groups sought to understand how such a sweeping shutdown had been possible—and how future incidents might be prevented. There was no centralized “kill switch.” Instead, authorities leveraged the country’s highly consolidated telecommunications sector, which all operate by government license. With only a handful of ISPs, a small number of directives was enough to bring most of the network offline. In the years following Egypt’s 2011 shutdown, telecommunications companies—many of which had been directly implicated in enabling state-ordered disruptions—began to organize around a shared set of human rights challenges. Beginning that same year, a group of operators and vendors quietly convened to examine how the <a href="https://www.business-human-rights.org/en/big-issues/governing-business-human-rights/un-guiding-principles/">UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights</a> applied to their sector, particularly in contexts where government demands could translate into sweeping restrictions on access. By 2013, this effort had formalized into the <a href="https://www.business-human-rights.org/en/latest-news/telecommunications-industry-dialogue/">Telecommunications Industry Dialogue</a>, bringing together major global firms to develop common principles on freedom of expression and privacy and, through a partnership with the <a href="https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/">Global Network Initiative</a>, engage more directly with civil society. The initiative reflected a growing recognition that telecom companies—unlike platforms—<a href="https://protectthestack.org/">operate at a critical chokepoint in the network</a>. But it also underscored the limits of voluntary approaches: while the Dialogue helped establish shared norms, it did little to constrain the legal and political pressures that continue to drive shutdowns—or to prevent companies from complying with them. ### From Emergency Measure to Legal Authority If the early aughts were defined by improvised shutdowns, the years since have seen governments formalize their power to control networks. What was once exceptional is now often embedded in law. In India, the <a href="https://sflc.in/new-rules-temporary-suspension-telecom-services-case-public-emergency-or-public-safety/">2017 Temporary Suspension of Telecom Services Rules</a>—issued under the Telegraph Act—provided a clear legal pathway for cutting connectivity. The Telecommunications Act, 2023, <a href="https://sflc.in/throttling-telecom/">further entrenched the government’s ability to enact shutdowns</a>, granting the central and state governments, or “authorised officers” the power to suspend telecommunications services in the interest of public safety or sovereignty, or during emergencies. The government has used these measures repeatedly, particularly in Jammu and Kashmir. India’s **Software Freedom Law Centre’s** <a href="https://internetshutdowns.in/">Shutdown Tracker</a> shows India as instigating more than 900 shutdowns, 447 of which were in Jammu and Kashmir. In Kazakhstan, <a href="https://www.accessnow.org/central-asia-internet-shutdowns-harm-rights/">shutdowns have also become common</a>. Over the years, the government has <a href="https://www.cfr.org/articles/consequences-internet-shutdowns-kazakhstan">passed legislation</a> that allows state agencies to shut down the internet. The 2012 law on national security enabled the government to disrupt communications channels during anti-terrorist operations and to contain riots. In 2014 and 2016, laws were further amended to expand the number of actors able to shut down the internet without a court decision, and a government decree in 2018 enabled shutdowns in the event of a “social emergency.” Elsewhere, governments have built or expanded legal and technical frameworks that enable similar control over information flows. Ethiopia’s state-dominated telecom sector has facilitated sweeping shutdowns during periods of conflict, including the war in Tigray, where the internet was <a href="https://www.accessnow.org/15-stories-from-tigrays-internet-siege/">disconnected for more than two years</a>. In Iran, authorities have developed regulatory and infrastructural capacity to isolate domestic networks from the global internet, allowing them to restrict external visibility while maintaining limited internal connectivity. This year alone, Iranians have spent <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/future/technology/2026/03/10/is-iran-internet-still-down/">one third of the year</a> offline. And amidst the ongoing war, Iranian officials have made it clear that the <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2026/03/iran-wields-wartime-internet-access-as-a-political-tool">internet is a privilege</a> for those who toe the government’s official line. Even where laws do not explicitly authorize shutdowns, broadly worded provisions around national security or public order are routinely used to justify them. The result is a growing legal architecture that treats network disruptions not as extraordinary measures, but as standard tools for managing populations. When that authority is exercised over a population beyond a state’s own citizens, the consequences can be even more severe. Israel’s Ministry of Communications <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2011/11/9/hacking-palestine-a-digital-occupation/">controls the flow of communications</a> in and out of Palestine and has used that power to shut down internet access <a href="https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/03/access-internet-infrastructure-essential-wartime-and-peacetime">during periods of conflict</a>. Over the past two and a half years, Gaza has experienced <a href="https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/10/internet-access-shou