Microsoft Releases Mitigations for 'YellowKey' Windows BitLocker Zero-Day
**Microsoft** has issued mitigations for 'YellowKey' (**CVE-2026-45585**), a recently disclosed Windows BitLocker zero-day vulnerability that could allow unauthorized access to protected drives. The vulnerability, revealed by an anonymous researcher known as 'Nightmare Eclipse,' involves manipulating 'FsTx' files to bypass BitLocker encryption.

## YellowKey: A BitLocker Bypass
The 'YellowKey' vulnerability, disclosed by 'Nightmare Eclipse,' allows attackers to gain unauthorized access to **BitLocker**-protected drives. The researcher published a proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit demonstrating how specially crafted 'FsTx' files placed on a USB drive or EFI partition can be used to trigger a shell with unrestricted access to the storage volume.
'Nightmare Eclipse' has been actively disclosing zero-day vulnerabilities, including **BlueHammer** (CVE-2026-33825) and **RedSun**, citing dissatisfaction with **Microsoft**'s Security Response Center (**MSRC**)'s handling of previous vulnerability disclosures. Other disclosed vulnerabilities include **GreenPlasma** and **UnDefend**.
## Microsoft's Response: Mitigations for CVE-2026-45585
**Microsoft** is now tracking the 'YellowKey' flaw as **CVE-2026-45585** and has released mitigation measures to protect against potential exploitation.
"Microsoft is aware of a security feature bypass vulnerability in Windows publicly referred to as 'YellowKey'. The proof of concept for this vulnerability has been made public violating coordinated vulnerability best practices," **Microsoft** stated in an advisory.
The recommended mitigations include:
* Removing the `autofstx.exe` entry from the Session Manager's BootExecute REG_MULTI_SZ value.
* Re-establishing BitLocker trust for WinRE, as detailed in the CVE-2026-33825 advisory.
* Configuring BitLocker on already encrypted devices from "TPM-only" mode to "TPM+PIN" mode.
* Enabling the "Require additional authentication at startup" option via **Microsoft Intune** or Group Policies for devices not yet encrypted, ensuring that "Configure TPM startup PIN" is set to "Require startup PIN with TPM."
According to Will Dormann, principal vulnerability analyst at **Tharros**, preventing `autofstx.exe` from automatically starting when the WinRE image launches prevents the Transactional NTFS replaying that deletes `winpeshl.ini`.

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