Last month, **Iran’s** *Tehran Times* posted what appeared to be satellite imagery purportedly showing the “complete destruction” of an “American radar” installation. However, open source intelligence researchers quickly debunked the claim, revealing the image to be an AI-manipulated version of an older **Google Earth** shot from **Bahrain**, complete with fabricated damage. This incident highlights a growing challenge: the satellite infrastructure relied upon for accurate conflict assessment is becoming a contested domain, subject to delays, spoofing, withholding, or control by actors with conflicting interests. ## No Longer Neutral Infrastructure Satellite infrastructure in the Gulf is largely operated by state-backed entities. These operators rely on geostationary satellites for broadcasting, communication, and weather forecasting. In the **United Arab Emirates**, **Space42** handles secure communications and Earth observation. **Saudi Arabia’s** **Arabsat** manages broadcasting and broadband, while **Qatar’s** **Es’hailSat** supports regional connectivity. All operate under strict government oversight. Iran is developing its own parallel system. Its satellites, including **Paya** (also known as **Tolou-3**), are part of a broader initiative to expand surveillance capabilities independently of Western infrastructure. The high-resolution Earth observation satellite was launched from **Russia’s** **Vostochny Cosmodrome**. The Middle East satellite communications sector is valued at over $4 billion and projected to reach $5.64 billion by 2031, driven by airborne connectivity linked to commercial aviation and defense. Maritime platforms already account for nearly a third of regional revenue. ## Access Is the New Bottleneck Commercial low-Earth orbit fleets like **Planet Labs** and **Maxar** operate differently from government-owned systems, with access being the primary constraint. Governments receive priority tasking, while newsrooms and NGOs depend on paid subscriptions. On March 11, Planet Labs announced it would extend delays on imagery of the Middle East by two weeks. The company stated that the decision was to “ensure our imagery is not tactically leveraged by adversarial actors to target allied and NATO-partner personnel and civilians.” Maryam Ishani Thompson, an open source intelligence reporter, noted that “the loss of Planet Labs is so harsh because we were getting a fast refresh rate. Even if we turn to Chinese satellites, we don’t get that speed.” Chinese platforms like **MizarVision**, a Shanghai-based open source geospatial intelligence provider, have seen increased use since the delays. **Russia** and **China** are also increasingly sharing satellite access with Iran, diversifying the control of imagery in the Gulf. ## If You Can’t Verify, You Can’t Challenge the Narrative Verification processes depend on historical reference points. The static nature of the *Tehran Times* image was detectable because journalists had recent imagery for comparison. Without that baseline, debunking such images becomes significantly harder. “In that opaque space,” Ishani says, “Iran is producing its own false narrative. If we can’t document it and fact-check it, they can continue to create a narrative and sell it to their people.” Victoria Samson, chief director of space security and stability at nonprofit Secure World Foundation, notes that the US government is a major customer for most commercial and privately owned satellite companies, creating “a reluctance to upset the US government.”